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Abstract
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in
preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of al-
ternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than
this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various
properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We
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1 Introduction
The Nakamura number plays a critical role in the study of preference aggre-
gation rules with acyclic social preferences.1 Consider a (simple) game2—a
coalitional game that assigns either 0 or 1 to each coalition: those assigned 1
are winning coalitions and those assigned 0 are losing coalitions. Combining
the game with a set of alternatives and a profile of individual preferences,
one obtains a simple game with (ordinal) preferences, from which one can
derive a social preference (dominance relation). Nakamura’s theorem (1979)
gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a simple game with prefer-
ences to have a nonempty core (the set of maximal elements of the social
preference) for all profiles: the number of alternatives is less than a certain
number (the smallest number of winning coalitions that collectively form
an empty intersection), called the Nakamura number of the simple game.
Thus the greater the Nakamura number for a given game is, the larger the
set of alternatives is from which the rule (mapping from profiles to social
preferences) can always find a maximal element.
Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Theorem 17) extend Nakamura’s theorem
to their framework and apply it to computable simple games. They show
that every (nonweak) computable game has a finite Nakamura number. This
implies that under the preference aggregation rule based on a computable
game, the number of alternatives that the set of players can deal with ra-
tionally is restricted by this number. (Remark 1 gives a formal discussion
of this result.)
We are therefore interested in the question of how large the Nakamura
number can be. In fact, Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Proposition 15) show
that every integer k ≥ 2 is the Nakamura number of some computable game.
Of course, a large Nakamura number can be attained only by satisfying or
violating certain properties for simple games. For example, the Nakamura
number of a nonproper game, which admits two complementing winning
coalitions, is at most 2 (Lemma 6).
In this paper, we study the restrictions that various properties (axioms)
for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We restrict our atten-
tion to the computable simple games and classify them into thirty-two (25)
classes in terms of their types (with respect to monotonicity, properness,3
1Banks (1995), Truchon (1995), and Andjiga and Mbih (2000) are recent contributions
to the literature. Earlier papers on acyclic rules can be found in Truchon (1995) and
Austen-Smith and Banks (1999). Note that acyclicity of a preference is necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a maximal element on every finite subset of alternatives.
When the weak social preferences are required to be transitive, we are back in Arrow’s
difficult setting (1963).
2Simple games are often referred to as “voting games” in the literature. In this paper,
we sometimes call them “games” for short.
3While simple games are often defined so that they are monotonic and proper, we
allow simple games to be nonmonotonic or nonproper for completeness. We can derive
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Table 1: Possible Nakamura Numbers for Computable Games
Types Finite Infinite Types Finite Infinite
1(+ +++) 3 3 9(−+++) 2 2
2(+ ++−) +∞ none 10(− ++−) none none
3(+ +−+) ≥ 3 ≥ 3 11(− +−+) ≥ 2 ≥ 2
4(+ +−−) +∞ +∞ 12(− +−−) +∞ +∞
5(+ −++) 2 2 13(− −++) 2 2
6(+ −+−) none none 14(− −+−) none none
7(+ −−+) 2 2 15(− −−+) 2 2
8(+ −−−) none none 16(− −−−) none none
Possible Nakamura numbers are given in each entry, assuming that an empty
coalition is losing (so that the Nakamura number is at least 2). The types are
defined by the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness,
and nonweakness. For example, the entries corresponding to Type 2 (+++−)
indicates that among the computable, monotonic (+), proper (+), strong (+),
weak (−, because not nonweak) games, finite ones have a Nakamura number
equal to +∞ and infinite ones do not exist.
strongness, and nonweakness) and finiteness (existence of a finite carrier).
Table 1 summarizes the results. For example, a type 5 (+−++) (monotonic,
nonproper, strong, nonweak) computable game has Nakamura number equal
to 2, whether it is finite or infinite.4 Note that the Nakamura number for a
weak game is infinite by definition.
We make two observations from Table 1. First, a nonweak computable
game has a Nakamura number greater than 3 only if it is proper, and nonstrong
(i.e., either of type 3 (+ + −+) or of type 11 (− + −+)).5 In particular,
such games from a strategic game form, giving a justification (strategic foundation) for
including them. For example, we obtain a nonproper game from the game form g, defined
by g(0, 0) = g(0, 1) = g(1, 0) = 0 and g(1, 1) = 1, which describes the unanimous voting
rule. Each player is effective for the set {0} in the sense that by choosing 0, she can force
the outcome to be in the set. Then the simple game consisting of the coalitions that are
effective for {0} is nonproper. For another example, we obtain in Remark 4 an important
class of nonmonotonic games from a certain class of game forms.
4Strictly speaking, we only assert in this paper that the numbers in each entry in
the table are not ruled out ; we are not much interested in asserting that every entry
not indicated “none” contains a game in which an empty coalition is losing. However,
those who accept the results in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) will find the latter assertion
acceptable. For most entries, the examples given in the paper cited suffice. For the other
entries, we need to modify the examples—which we do, with the exception of a few entries
(footnote 13).
5Propositions 11 and 19 state that any Nakamura number k ≥ 3 is attainable by type 3
finite and infinite games. Propositions 12 and 20 state that any Nakamura number k ≥ 2
is attainable by type 11 finite and infinite games. Remark 4 gives a strategic foundations
for these games.
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for the players to be always able to choose a maximal element from at least
three alternatives, strongness of the game must be forgone (unless the game
is dictatorial (type 2)). The reader should not overlook the importance of
the number 3 in the above observation. It is the Nakamura number of the
majority game with an odd number of (at least three) players. To deal
with three or more alternatives rationally (though it is generally impossible
to rank them (Arrow, 1963)) requires a Nakamura number greater than 3.
Second, as far as computable games are concerned, a number k is the Naka-
mura number of a finite game of a certain type (except type 2) if and only
if it is that of an infinite game of the same type. Restricting games to finite
ones does not reduce or increase the number of alternatives that the players
can deal with rationally.
In contrast, if we drop the computability condition, these observations
are no longer true. A “nonprincipal ultrafilter,” which is noncomputable and
has an infinite Nakamura number (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008), serves as a
counterexample to both: It is a nonweak game with a Nakamura number
greater than 3, but it is strong. It is a type 1 infinite game with a Nakamura
number different from 3, the Nakamura number of type 1 finite games. In
fact, one can use ultrafilters not only to find a maximal element from any
finite set of alternatives (regardless of the size), but also to rank (while
preserving the transitivity of the weak social preference) any number of
alternatives (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Section 5). This fact explains why
nonprincipal ultrafilters are used for resolving Arrow’s impossibility (1963).
The lack of computability of nonprincipal ultrafilters, however, implies that
such resolutions are impractical (Mihara, 1997).
The rest of the Introduction gives a background briefly. Much of it is
fully discussed in Kumabe and Mihara (2008).
One can think of simple games as representing voting methods or multi-
criterion decision rules. They have been central to the study of social choice
(e.g., Peleg, 2002). For this reason, the paper can be viewed as a contribution
to the foundations of computability analysis of social choice, which studies
algorithmic properties of social decision-making.6
The importance of computability in social choice theory would be unar-
guable. First, the use of the language by social choice theorists suggests the
importance: for example, Arrow (1963) uses words such as “process or rule”
or “procedure.” Second, there is a normative reason: computability of social
choice rules formalizes the notion of “due process.”7
We consider an infinite set of “players.” Roughly speaking, a simple
game is computable if there is a Turing program (finite algorithm) that
6This literature includes Kelly (1988), Lewis (1988), Bartholdi et al. (1989a,b), Mihara
(1997, 1999, 2004), Kumabe and Mihara (2008, 2007), and Tanaka (2007).
7Richter and Wong (1999) give further justifications for studying computability-based
economic theories.
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can decide from a description (by integer) of each coalition whether it is
winning or losing. Since each member of a coalition should be describable,
we assume that the set N of (the names of) players is countable, say, N =
N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Also, we describe coalitions by a Turing program that can
decide for the name of each player whether she is in the coalition. Since
each Turing program has its code number (Go¨del number), the coalitions
describable in this manner are describable by an integer, as desired. (Such
coalitions are called recursive coalitions.)
Kumabe and Mihara (2008) give three interpretations of countably many
players: (i) generations of people extending into the indefinite future, (ii)
finitely many persons facing countably many states of the world (Mihara,
1997), and (iii) attributes or criteria in multi-criterion decision-making.8 We
can naturally re-interpret the preference aggregation problem (which pro-
vides motivation for studying the Nakamura number) as a multi-criterion
ranking problem, for example. In multi-criterion ranking, each criterion
ranks finitely many alternatives; we are interested in aggregating those
countably many rankings into one (acyclic relation). Assuming that the
underlying simple game is computable is intuitively plausible in view of the
following consequences: (i) each criterion is treated differently;9 (ii) whether
an alternative has a higher rank than another can be determined by exam-
ine finitely many criteria, though how many criteria need to be examined
depends on each situation (Proposition 4). The (lack of strongness) obser-
vation mentioned above suggests that rational choice from many (at least
three) alternatives often involves alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.
2 Framework
2.1 Simple games
Let N = N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be a countable set of (the names of) players. Any
recursive (algorithmically decidable) subset of N is called a (recursive)
coalition.
Intuitively, a simple game describes in a crude manner the power dis-
tribution among observable (or describable) coalitions (subsets of players).
We assume that only recursive coalitions are observable. According to
Church’s thesis (Soare, 1987; Odifreddi, 1992), the recursive coalitions are
the sets of players for which there is an algorithm that can decide for the
name of each player whether she is in the set.10 Note that the class REC
8Legal decisions involve (iii). Kumabe and Mihara (2007) discuss the formation of legal
precedents, in which an infinite number of criteria are potentially relevant but only finitely
many of them are actually cited.
9Computable simple games violate anonymity (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Proposi-
tion 13).
10Soare (1987) and Odifreddi (1992) give a more precise definition of recursive sets as
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of recursive coalitions forms a Boolean algebra; that is, it includes N
and is closed under union, intersection, and complementation.
Formally, a (simple) game is a collection ω ⊆ REC of (recursive) coali-
tions. We will be explicit when we require that N ∈ ω. The coalitions in ω
are said to be winning. The coalitions not in ω are said to be losing. One
can regard a simple game as a function from REC to {0, 1}, assigning the
value 1 or 0 to each coalition, depending on whether it is winning or losing.
We introduce from the theory of cooperative games a few basic notions
of simple games (Peleg, 2002; Weber, 1994). A simple game ω is said to be
monotonic if for all coalitions S and T , the conditions S ∈ ω and T ⊇ S
imply T ∈ ω. ω is proper if for all recursive coalitions S, S ∈ ω implies
Sc := N \S /∈ ω. ω is strong if for all coalitions S, S /∈ ω implies Sc ∈ ω. ω
is weak if ω = ∅ or the intersection
⋂
ω =
⋂
S∈ω S of the winning coalitions
is nonempty. The members of
⋂
ω are called veto players; they are the
players that belong to all winning coalitions. (The set
⋂
ω of veto players
may or may not be observable.) ω is dictatorial if there exists some i0
(called a dictator) in N such that ω = {S ∈ REC : i0 ∈ S }. Note that a
dictator is a veto player, but a veto player is not necessarily a dictator. It
is immediate to prove the following well-known lemmas:
Lemma 1 If a simple game is weak, it is proper.
Lemma 2 A simple game is dictatorial if and only if it is strong and weak.
A carrier of a simple game ω is a coalition S ⊂ N such that
T ∈ ω ⇐⇒ S ∩ T ∈ ω
for all coalitions T . When a game ω has a carrier T , we often restrict the
game on T and identify ω with ω|T := {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω}. We observe that if
S is a carrier, then so is any coalition S′ ⊇ S. Slightly abusing the word, we
sometimes say a game is finite if it has a finite carrier; otherwise, the game
is infinite.
The Nakamura number ν(ω) of a game ω is the size of the smallest
collection of winning coalitions having empty intersection
ν(ω) = min{#ω′ : ω′ ⊆ ω and
⋂
ω′ = ∅}
if
⋂
ω = ∅ (i.e., ω is nonweak); otherwise, set ν(ω) = +∞, which is under-
stood to be greater than any cardinal number. In computing the Nakamura
number for a game, it suffices to look only at the subfamily of minimal win-
ning coalitions, provided that the game is finite. If the game is infinite, we
cannot say so since minimal winning coalitions may not exist.
well as detailed discussion of recursion theory. The papers by Mihara (1997, 1999) contain
short reviews of recursion theory.
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Extending and applying the well-known result by Nakamura (1979),
Kumabe and Mihara (2008) show that computability of a game entails a
restriction on the number of alternatives that the set of players (with the
coalition structure described by the game) can deal with rationally. The
following remark gives a formal presentation of that result, adapted to the
present framework.
Remark 1 Let X be a (finite or infinite) set of alternatives, with cardinal
number #X ≥ 2. Let A be the set of (strict) preferences, i.e., acyclic (for
any finite set {x1, x2, . . . , xm} ⊆ X, if x1 ≻ x2, . . . , xm−1 ≻ xm, then
xm 6≻ x1; in particular, ≻ is asymmetric and irreflexive) binary relations ≻
on X. A profile is a list p = (≻pi )i∈N ∈ A
N of individual preferences ≻pi
such that { i ∈ N : x ≻pi y } ∈ REC for all x, y ∈ X.
A simple game with (ordinal) preferences is a list (ω,X,p) of a simple
game ω in which an empty coalition is losing, a set X of alternatives, and a
profile p. Given a simple game with preferences, we define the dominance
relation (social preference) ≻pω by x ≻
p
ω y if and only if there is a winning
coalition S ∈ ω such that x ≻pi y for all i ∈ S. Note that the mapping ≻ω
from profiles p to dominance relations ≻pω defines an aggregation rule. The
core C(ω,X,p) of the simple game with preferences is the set of undomi-
nated alternatives:
C(ω,X,p) = {x ∈ X : 6 ∃y ∈ X such that y ≻pω x}.
Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Corollary 19) show that if ω is computable and
nonweak, then there exists a finite number ν (the Nakamura number ν(ω))
such that the core C(ω,X,p) is nonempty for all profiles p if and only if
#X < ν.
2.2 The computability notion
To define the notion of computability for simple games, we first introduce
an indicator for them. In order to do that, we first represent each recursive
coalition by a characteristic index (∆0-index). Here, a number e is a char-
acteristic index for a coalition S if ϕe (the partial function computed by
the Turing program with code number e) is the characteristic function for S.
Intuitively, a characteristic index for a coalition describes the coalition by
a Turing program that can decide its membership. The indicator then as-
signs the value 0 or 1 to each number representing a coalition, depending
on whether the coalition is winning or losing. When a number does not
represent a recursive coalition, the value is undefined.
Given a simple game ω, its δ-indicator is the partial function δω on N
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defined by
δω(e) =


1 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set in ω,
0 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set not in ω,
↑ if e is not a characteristic index for any recursive set.
Note that δω is well-defined since each e ∈ N can be a characteristic index
for at most one set.
We now introduce the notion of (δ)-computable games. We start by
giving an intuition. A number (characteristic index) representing a coali-
tion (equivalently, a Turing program that can decide the membership of the
coalition) is presented by an inquirer to the aggregator (planner), who will
compute whether the coalition is winning or not. The aggregator cannot
know a priori which indices will possibly be presented to her. So, the aggre-
gator should be ready to give an answer whenever a characteristic index for
some recursive set is presented to her. This intuition justifies the following
condition of computability.11
(δ)-computability δω has an extension to a partial recursive function.
3 Preliminary Results
In this section, we give a sufficient condition and a necessary condition for
a game to be computable.
Notation. We identify a natural number k with the finite set {0, 1, 2, . . . , k−
1}, which is an initial segment of N. Given a coalition S ⊆ N , we write
S ∩ k to represent the coalition {i ∈ S : i < k} consisting of the members
of S whose name is less than k. We call S ∩ k the k-initial segment of
S, and view it either as a subset of N or as the string S[k] of length k
of 0’s and 1’s (representing the restriction of its characteristic function to
{0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}). ‖
Definition 1 Consider a simple game. A string τ (of 0’s and 1’s) of length k ≥
0 is winning determining if any coalition G ∈ REC extending τ (in the
sense that τ is an initial segment of G, i.e., G∩k = τ) is winning; τ is losing
determining if any coalition G ∈ REC extending τ is losing. A string is
determining if it is either winning determining or losing determining. A
string is nondetermining if it is not determining.
The following proposition restates a sufficient condition (Kumabe and Mihara,
2008, the “if” direction of Theorem 4) for a game to be computable. In par-
ticular, finite games are computable. The proposition can be proved easily:
11Mihara (2004) also proposes a stronger condition, σ-computability. We discard that
condition since it is too strong a notion of computability (Proposition 3 of that paper; for
example, even dictatorial games are not σ-computable).
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Proposition 3 (Kumabe and Mihara (2007)) Let T0 and T1 be recur-
sively enumerable sets of (nonempty) strings such that any coalition has an
initial segment in T0 or in T1 but not both. Let ω be the simple game defined
by S ∈ ω if and only if S has an initial segment in T1. Then T1 consists
only of winning determining strings, T0 consists only of losing determining
strings, and ω is δ-computable.
The following proposition (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Proposition 3)
gives a necessary condition for a game to be computable:
Proposition 4 (Kumabe and Mihara (2008)) Suppose that a δ-computable
simple game is given. (i) If a coalition S is winning, then it has an initial
segment S[k] (for some k ∈ N) that is winning determining. (ii) If S is
losing, then it has an initial segment S[k] that is losing determining.
4 The Main Results
We classify computable games into thirty-two (25) classes as shown in Ta-
ble 1, in terms of their (conventional) types (with respect to the conven-
tional axioms of monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness)
and finiteness (existence of a finite carrier). Among the sixteen types, five
(types 6, 8, 10, 14, and 16) contain no games; also, the class of type 2 infinite
games is empty (since type 2 games are dictatorial).12
We therefore have only (16−5)×2−1 = 21 classes of games to be checked.
For each such class, we find the set of possible Nakamura numbers. We do so,
whenever important, by constructing a game in the class having a particular
Nakamura number, unless the example given in Kumabe and Mihara (2007)
suffices.13
We only consider games in which ∅ is losing. Otherwise, the Naka-
mura number for the game becomes 1—not a very interesting case. (Also,
note that if ∅ is winning and the game has a losing coalition, then it is
nonmonotonic.)
We consider weak games first. Among the weak games, types 2, 4, and
12 are nonempty.14 By definition, their Nakamura number is infinite. We
have so far examined all the types whose labels are even numbers.
12These results, also found in Kumabe and Mihara (2007), are immediate from Lemmas
1 and 2.
13Some examples in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) violate the condition that ∅ is los-
ing, which we impose in this paper. In this paper, we omit examples of games with a
small Nakamura number when the construction is based on the details of the paper cited.
Specifically, we relegate examples of a type 9 infinite game and a type 13 infinite game to
Appendix B.
14These types, being weak, consist of games in which ∅ is losing. Kumabe and Mihara
(2007) give examples of these types of games.
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We henceforth consider nonweak (hence nonempty by definition) com-
putable games. Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Corollary 16) show that they
have finite Nakamura numbers:
Lemma 5 (Kumabe and Mihara (2008)) Let ω be a computable, non-
weak simple game. Then, its Nakamura number ν(ω) is finite.
4.1 Small Nakamura numbers
First, the definition of proper games implies the following:15
Lemma 6 Let ω be a game satisfying ∅ /∈ ω (and ω 6= ∅). If ω is nonproper,
then ω is nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
Lemma 6 is equivalent to the assertion that a game is proper if its Naka-
mura number ν(ω) is at least 3. It does not rule out the possibility that
proper games have Nakamura number equal to 2. Lemma 6 implies that
the games of types 5, 7, 13, and 15 have Nakamura number equal to 2.
Example 1 gives examples of type 13 and type 15 finite games.16
Example 1 We first give a type 13 finite game. Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a
carrier and let ω|T := {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω} consist of {0, 1, 2}, {1, 2}, {0}, {1},
{2}. The other three coalitions in T are losing. Then, ω is nonmonotonic,
nonproper, strong, and nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
We next give a type 15 finite game. Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier and
let ω|T consist of {0, 1, 2}, {1, 2}, {0}, {1}. The other four coalitions in T
are losing. Then, ω is nonmonotonic, nonproper, nonstrong, and nonweak
with ν(ω) = 2.
Next, we consider computable strong games that are nonweak. These
games have Nakamura numbers not greater than 3:
Lemma 7 Let ω be a computable, strong nonweak game satisfying ∅ /∈ ω.
Then ν(ω) = 2 or 3.
15The conditions ω 6= ∅ in Lemmas 6 and 9 are redundant, since an empty game is
monotonic, proper, nonstrong, and weak, according to our definition. We retain the
conditions in parentheses, since the definitions of these properties are not well-established
for an empty game.
16It is easy to show that types 5 and 7 contain games in which ∅ is losing. If ∅ were
winning, then by monotonicity the game would consist of all coalitions (a type 5 game).
Since the examples of types 5 and 7 games in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) all have losing
coalitions, ∅ is losing in those games. The type 15 infinite game in that paper satisfies the
condition that ∅ is losing. To show that type 13 contains an infinite game in which ∅ is
losing is more delicate, but can be done (Appendix B) by modifying the example in that
paper.
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Proof. Since ω is computable, by Proposition 4, every winning coali-
tion has a finite subcoalition that is winning, which in turn has a minimal
winning subcoalition that is winning. If there is only one minimal winning
coalition S 6= ∅, then the intersection of all winning coalitions is S, which
is nonempty; this violates the nonweakness of ω. So there are at least two
(distinct) minimal winning coalitions S1 and S2 in ω. Let S = S1 ∩S2. S is
losing since it is a proper subcoalition of the minimal winning coalition S1.
Then, since ω is strong, Sc is winning. Since S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S
c = S ∩ Sc = ∅,
we have ν(ω) ≤ 3 by the definition of the Nakamura number. The as-
sumption that ∅ /∈ ω rules out ν(ω) = 1. (ν(ω) = 2 if there are distinct
minimal winning coalitions S1 and S2 such that S = S1 ∩S2 = ∅; otherwise,
ν(ω) = 3.)
Remark 2 The computability condition cannot be dropped from Lemma 7
(a minimal winning coalition may not exist if a winning coalition has no
finite, winning subcoalition). A nonprincipal ultrafilter is a counterexam-
ple; it has an infinite Nakamura number. (See Kumabe and Mihara (2008,
Sections 2.1 and 4.3) for the definition of a nonprincipal ultrafilter and the
observation that it has no finite winning coalitions and is noncomputable,
monotonic, proper, strong, and nonweak.)
Lemma 8 Let ω be a monotonic proper game satisfying ∅ /∈ ω and ω 6= ∅.
Then ν(ω) ≥ 3.
Proof. Suppose ν(ω) = 2. Then, there are winning coalitions S, S′
whose intersection is empty. That is S′ ⊆ Sc. By monotonicity, Sc is
winning, implying that ω is not proper.
Lemma 9 Let ω be a nonmonotonic strong game satisfying ∅ /∈ ω (and
ω 6= ∅). Then ω is nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
Proof. Since nonempty ω is nonmonotonic, there exist a winning coali-
tion S and a losing coalition S′ such that S ∩ S′c = ∅. This means that the
Nakamura number is 2, since S′c is winning by strongness of ω.
Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 imply that type 1 games have a Nakamura
number equal to 3. Lemma 9 implies that type 9 games have a Nakamura
number equal to 2. Proposition 10 and Example 2 give examples of these
games:17
Proposition 10 There exist finite, type 1 (i.e., monotonic proper strong
nonweak) games and infinite, computable, type 1 games.
17We can also give an example of an infinite, computable, type 9 game (Appendix B).
It rests on the details of the construction in Kumabe and Mihara (2007).
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Proof. An example of a type 1 finite game is the majority game with
an odd number of (at least three) players. An example of a type 1 infinite
game is given in Appendix A.
Example 2 We give a type 9 finite game. Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier
and let ω|T := {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω} consist of {0, 1, 2}, {0}, {1}, {2}. The other
four coalitions in T are losing. Then, ω is nonmonotonic, proper, strong,
and nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
4.2 Large Nakamura numbers
Having considered all the other types of games, we now turn to types 3
and 11 (i.e., proper nonstrong nonweak games). These are the only types
that may have a Nakamura number greater than 3.
First, we consider games with finite carriers. An example of a game
having Nakamura number equal to k ≥ 2 can be defined on the carrier
T = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}; the game ω consists of the coalitions excluding at
most one player in the carrier: S ∈ ω if and only if #(T ∩ S) ≥ k − 1. We
extend this example slightly:
Proposition 11 For any k ≥ 3, there exists a finite, computable, type 3
(i.e., monotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura number
ν(ω) = k.
Proof. Given k ≥ 2, let {T0, T1, . . . , Tk−1} be a partition of a finite
carrier T =
⋃k−1
l=0 Tl. Define S ∈ ω iff #{Tl : Tl ⊆ S} ≥ k − 1. Then it is
straightforward to show that ω is monotonic and nonweak with ν(ω) = k.
Now, suppose that k ≥ 3. To show that ω is proper, suppose S ∈ ω. Then S
includes at least k−1 of the partition elements Tl, implying that S
c includes
at most one of them. To show that ω is nonstrong, suppose that a partition
element, say Tl, contains at least two players, one of whom is denoted by t.
We then have the following two losing coalitions complementing each other:
(i) the union of k−2 partition elements Tl′ and {t} and (ii) the union of the
other partition element and Tl \ {t}.
Remark 3 Because of Lemma 8, Proposition 11 precludes k = 2. Note
that the game in the proof is nonproper if and only if k = 2. If k ≤ 3, then
it generally fails to be strong, though it is indeed strong if all the partition
elements Tl consist of singletons.
Proposition 12 For any k ≥ 2, there exists a finite, computable, type 11
(i.e., nonmonotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura
number ν(ω) = k.
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Proof. Given k ≥ 3, let {T0, T1, . . . , Tk−1} be a partition of a finite
carrier T =
⋃k−1
l=0 Tl. Define S ∈ ω iff #{Tl : Tl ⊆ S} = k − 1. Then ω is
nonmonotonic; the rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 11.
For k = 2, we give the following example: Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier
and define ω|T = {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω} = {{0}, {1}}. It is nonmonotonic since
{0} ∈ ω but {0, 1} /∈ ω. It is proper: S ∈ ω implies S ∩ T = {0} or {1},
which in turn implies Sc ∩ T = {1, 2} or {0, 2}, neither of which is in ω|T ;
hence Sc /∈ ω. It is nonstrong since {0, 1} and {2} are losing. It is nonweak
with ν(ω) = 2 since the intersection of the winning coalitions {0} and {1}
is empty.
Remark 4 (Strategic Foundations) We justify (give a strategic founda-
tion for) type 3 and type 11 simple games having Nakamura number equal
to k ≥ 3 by deriving them from certain game forms. These types particu-
larly deserve justification, since they are the only types that contain (two
games with different Nakamura numbers and) games with an arbitrarily
large Nakamura number.
Let g:
∏
Σi → X be a game form on the set {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} of players,
defined by g(σ) = 1 if and only if #{i : σi = 1} ≥ k−1, where Σi = {0, 1} is
the set of player i’s strategies andX = {0, 1} is the set of outcomes. One can
think of the game form as representing a voting rule in which no individual
has the veto power. We claim that, depending on the notion of effectivity
employed, the simple game derived from g is either (i) the type 3 game
consisting of the coalitions containing at least k − 1 players (a game in the
proof of Proposition 11) or (ii) the type 11 game consisting of the coalitions
made up of exactly k − 1 players (a game in the proof of Proposition 12).
(i) For each coalition S ⊆ I, let ΣS :=
∏
i∈S Σi and Σ−S :=
∏
i/∈S Σi be
the collective strategy set of S and that of the complement. A coalition S
is α-effective for a subset B ⊆ X if S has a strategy σS ∈ ΣS such that
for any strategy σ−S ∈ Σ−S of the complement, g(σS , σ−S) ∈ B.
18 Define a
simple game as the set of winning coalitions, where a coalition is winning if
it is α-effective for all subsets of X. One can easily check that the winning
coalitions for our g are the coalitions containing at least k − 1 players.
(ii) A coalition S is exactly effective for a subsetB ⊆ X ifB = {g(σS , σ−S) :
σ−S ∈ Σ−S} for some σS ∈ ΣS .
19 Define a simple game as the set of winning
18The notion of α-effectivity is standard (e.g., Peleg, 2002).
19This notion of effectivity is proposed by Kolpin (1990). It is more informative than α-
effectivity. Indeed, S is α-effective for B if and only if there exists some B′ ⊆ B such that
S is exactly effective for B′. If a coalition S is exactly effective (not just α-effective) for a
set B of at least two elements, then the complement Sc can realize every (not just some)
element in B by a suitable choice of strategies. Intuitively, then, S has the power to leave
the others to choose from B. This notion is potentially more suitable for studying certain
aspects of the theory of rights than α-effectivity is, since it describes a coalition’s right to
stay passive more finely. (Deb (2004, Definition 11) is an example of an application to the
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coalitions, where a coalition is winning if it is exactly effective for all subsets
of X. Then, the winning coalitions for our g are the coalitions made up of
exactly k − 1 players, which confirms our claim. In particular, the grand
coalition {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}—while it is exactly effective for {0} and {1}—is
not exactly effective for {0, 1}, but a coalition made up of exactly k − 1
players is.
Next, we move on to games without finite carriers. We construct them
using the notion of the product of games. By a recursive function f on
a recursive set T ⊆ N we mean a recursive function restricted to T .
Let (f1, f2) be a pair consisting of a one-to-one recursive function f1 on
a (not necessarily finite) recursive set T ⊆ N and a one-to-one recursive
function f2, whose images partition the set of players: f1(T ) ∩ f2(N) = ∅
and f1(T ) ∪ f2(N) = N . Note that f
−1
1 and f
−1
2 are recursive functions on
recursive sets f1(T ) and f2(N), respectively.
20
We define the disjoint image of coalitions S1 ⊆ T and S2 ⊆ N with
respect to (f1, f2) as the set
S1 ∗ S2 = f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2),
where f1(S1) = {f1(i) : i ∈ S1} and f2(S2) = {f2(i) : i ∈ S2}.
Example 3 When T = N , an easy example is given by f1 : i 7→ 2i and
f2 : i 7→ 2i + 1. In this case, f1(T ) = 2N := {2i : i ∈ N}, f2(N) =
2N + 1 := {2i + 1 : i ∈ N}, and {0, 2, 3} ∗ {1, 2, 4} = {0, 4, 6, 3, 5, 9}.
When T = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} for some k ≥ 1, an easy example is given by
f1 : i 7→ i and f2 : i 7→ i + k. In this case, if k = 4, we have f1(T ) = T ,
f2(N) = N \ T = {4, 5, 6, . . .}, and {0, 2, 3} ∗ {1, 2, 4} = {0, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8}.
Lemma 13 Let REC be the class of (recursive) coalitions. Then,
{S1 ∗ S2 : S1 ⊆ T and S2 are coalitions} = REC.
Proof. (⊆). By an argument similar to that in footnote 20, f1(S1) and
f2(S2) are recursive. It follows that f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2) is recursive.
theory of rights.) To show that α-effectivity is inadequate, take, for example, “maximal
freedom” and the “right to be completely passive” by van Hees (1999). Van Hees resolves
the liberal paradox by adopting either of these notions. A necessary condition for maximal
freedom is monotonicity with respect to alternatives: if a coalition is effective for a set, it
should be effective for a larger set. A coalition is said to have the right to be completely
passive if it is effective for the set X of all alternatives. Since α-effectivity is monotonic
with respect to alternatives and since every coalition is α-effective for X, α-effectivity fails
to capture the subtle, but important differences that these notions can discriminate.
20In general, if f is a recursive function and S is a recursive set, then the image f(S)
is recursively enumerable. So f1(T ) and f2(N) are recursively enumerable. Since they
complement each other on the set N , they are in fact both recursive.
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(⊇). Let S be recursive. Then
S = [S ∩ f1(T )] ∪ [S ∩ f2(N)]
= [f1(f
−1
1 (S ∩ f1(T )))] ∪ [f2(f
−1
2 (S ∩ f2(N)))]
Let ω1 be a game with a carrier included in a set T . (This is without
loss of generality since the grand coalition N is a carrier for any game.) Let
ω2 be a game. We define the product ω1⊗ω2 of ω1 and ω2 with respect
to (f1, f2) by the set
ω1 ⊗ ω2 = {f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2) : S1 ∈ ω1 and S2 ∈ ω2}
of the disjoint images of winning coalitions.21 By Lemma 13, ω1 ⊗ ω2 is a
simple game. We have S1 ∗S2 ∈ ω1⊗ ω2 if and only if S1 ∈ ω1 and S2 ∈ ω2.
Lemma 14 If ω1 and ω2 are computable, then the product ω1 ⊗ ω2 is com-
putable.
Proof. Let e be a characteristic index for a coalition S := S1 ∗ S2 =
f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2). It suffices to show that given e, we can effectively obtain a
characteristic index for S1 (and similarly for S2).
Let t be a characteristic index for f1(T ), a fixed recursive set. Effectively
obtain (Soare, 1987, Corollary II.2.3) from e and t a characteristic index e′
for f1(S1) = [f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2)] ∩ f1(T ). Let t
′ be an index for the recursive
function
ϕt′(i) =
{
f1(i) if i ∈ T
f2(0) otherwise.
We claim that ϕe′ ◦ϕt′ is the characteristic function for the recursive set S1.
(Details. Suppose i ∈ S1 first. Then i ∈ T and f1(i) ∈ f1(S1). Hence
ϕe′ ◦ ϕt′(i) = ϕe′(f1(i)) = 1. Suppose i /∈ S1 next. If i ∈ T , then f1(i) ∈
f1(T )\f1(S1). Hence ϕe′ ◦ϕt′(i) = ϕe′(f1(i)) = 0. If i /∈ T , then ϕe′ ◦ϕt′(i) =
ϕe′(f2(0)) = 0, since f2(0) /∈ f1(S1).)
By the Parameter Theorem (Soare, 1987, I.3.5), there is a recursive func-
tion g such that ϕg(e′)(i) = ϕe′ ◦ ϕt′(i), implying that g(e
′) is characteristic
index for S1 that can be obtained effectively.
It turns out that the construction based on the product is very useful
for our purpose.
Lemma 15 ω1 and ω2 are monotonic if and only if the product ω1 ⊗ ω2 is
monotonic.
21The notion of the product of games is not new. For example, Shapley (1962) defines
it for two games on disjoint subsets of players.
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Proof. By Lemma 13, any coalition Sˆ can be written as Sˆ = Sˆ1 ∗ Sˆ2 for
some Sˆ1 ⊆ T and Sˆ2.
(=⇒). Suppose S1 ∗ S2 ∈ ω1 ⊗ ω2 and S1 ∗ S2 ⊆ S
′
1 ∗ S
′
2. Then, we
have S1 ∈ ω1, S2 ∈ ω2, and f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2) ⊆ f1(S
′
1) ∪ f2(S
′
2). Noting
that f1(S1) ⊆ f1(T ), f1(S
′
1) ⊆ f1(T ), f2(S2) ⊆ f2(N), f2(S
′
2) ⊆ f2(N), and
f1(T ) ∩ f2(N) = ∅, we have f1(S1) ⊆ f1(S′1) and f2(S2) ⊆ f2(S
′
2). Hence
S1 ⊆ S
′
1 and S2 ⊆ S
′
2. Since S1 ∈ ω1 and S2 ∈ ω2, monotonicity implies that
S′1 ∈ ω1 and S
′
2 ∈ ω2. That is, S
′
1 ∗ S
′
2 ∈ ω1 ⊗ ω2.
(⇐=). We suppose that ω1 ⊗ ω2 is monotonic and show that ω1 is
monotonic. Suppose S1 ∈ ω1 and S1 ⊂ S
′
1. Choose any S2 ∈ ω2. Then
S1 ∗ S2 ∈ ω1 ⊗ ω2. By monotonicity, S
′
1 ∗ S2 ∈ ω1 ⊗ ω2. Hence S
′
1 ∈ ω1.
Lemma 16 If ω1 or ω2 is proper, then the product ω1 ⊗ ω2 is proper.
Proof. First, we can show that (S1∗S2)
c = Sc1∗S
c
2, where S
c
1 = T \S1 and
Sc2 = N \S2. Indeed, (S1∗S2)
c = (f1(S1)∪f2(S2))
c = (f1(S1))
c∩(f2(S2))
c =
[f1(T )\f1(S1)∪f2(N)]∩ [f1(T )∪f2(N)\f2(S2)] = f1(T \S1)∪f2(N \S2) =
Sc1 ∗ S
c
2.
Now suppose S1 ∗ S2 ∈ ω1 ⊗ ω2. Then, S1 ∈ ω1 and S2 ∈ ω2. Since
ω1 or ω2 is proper, we have either S
c
1 /∈ ω1 or S
c
2 /∈ ω2. It follows that
(S1 ∗ S2)
c = Sc1 ∗ S
c
2 /∈ ω1 ⊗ ω2.
Lemma 17 Suppose ω1 is nonstrong or ω2 is nonstrong or both ω1 and ω2
have losing coalitions. Then the product ω1 ⊗ ω2 is nonstrong.
Proof. We give a proof for the case where each game has a losing coali-
tion: S1 /∈ ω1 and S
c
2 /∈ ω2. Then, S1∗S2 /∈ ω1⊗ω2 and (S1∗S2)
c = Sc1∗S
c
2 /∈
ω1 ⊗ ω2.
Lemma 18 If ω1 and ω2 are nonweak, then the product ω1⊗ω2 is nonweak.
Its Nakamura number is ν(ω1 ⊗ ω2) = max{ν(ω1), ν(ω2)}.
Proof. If
⋂
ω1 =
⋂
ω2 = ∅, then
⋂
(ω1 ⊗ ω2) =
⋂
S1∗S2∈ω1⊗ω2
(S1 ∗ S2) =⋂
S1∈ω1,S2∈ω2
(f1(S1) ∪ f2(S2)) = (
⋂
S1∈ω1
f1(S1)) ∪ (
⋂
S2∈ω2
f2(S2)) [because
f1(S1) ∩ f2(S2) = ∅ for all S1 and S2] = f1(
⋂
S1∈ω1
S1) ∪ f2(
⋂
S2∈ω2
S2) =
(
⋂
ω1) ∗ (
⋂
ω2) = ∅. The proof for the Nakamura number is similar.
Propositions 11 and 12 have analogues for infinite games (because of
Lemma 8 again, Proposition 19 precludes k = 2):
Proposition 19 For any k ≥ 3, there exists an infinite, computable, type 3
(i.e., monotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura number
ν(ω) = k.
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Proof. For k ≥ 3, let ω1 be a finite, computable, type 3 game with
ν(ω1) = k. (Such a game exists by Proposition 11.) Let ω2 be an infinite,
computable, monotonic nonweak game (which need not be proper or strong
or nonstrong) with ν(ω2) ≤ 3. (Such a game exists by Proposition 10.)
Lemmas 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 imply that the product ω1 ⊗ ω2 satisfies the
conditions.
Proposition 20 For any k ≥ 2, there exists an infinite, computable, type 11
(i.e., nonmonotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura
number ν(ω) = k.
Proof. For k ≥ 2, let ω1 be a finite, computable, type 11 game with
ν(ω1) = k. (Such a game exists by Proposition 12.) Let ω2 be an infinite,
computable, nonproper game. (Types 5, 7, 13, and 15 in Kumabe and Mihara
(2007) are examples. Alternatively, just for obtaining the results for k ≥ 3,
we can let ω2 be an infinite, computable, nonweak game with ν(ω2) = 3,
which exists by Proposition 10.) Then the game is nonweak, with ν(ω2) = 2
(if ∅ /∈ ω2; Lemma 6) or ν(ω2) = 1 (otherwise). Lemmas 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
imply that the product ω1 ⊗ ω2 satisfies the conditions.
A An Infinite, Computable, Type 1 Game
We exhibit here an infinite, computable, type 1 (i.e., monotonic proper strong
nonweak) simple game, thus giving a proof to Proposition 10. Though
Kumabe and Mihara (2007) give an example, the readers not comfortable
with recursion theory may find it too complicated. In view of the fact that
such a game is used in an important result (e.g., Proposition 19) in this
paper, it makes sense to give a simpler construction here.22
Our approach is to construct recursively enumerable (in fact, recursive)
sets T0 and T1 of strings (of 0’s and 1’s) satisfying the conditions of Proposi-
tion 3. We first construct certain sets Fs of strings for s ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We
then specify each of T0 and T1 using the sets Fs, and construct a simple game
ω according to Proposition 3. We conclude that the game is computable by
checking (Lemmas 22 and 25) that T0 and T1 satisfy the conditions of Propo-
sition 3. Finally, we show (Claims 27, 28, and 29) that the game satisfies
the desired properties.
22One reason that the construction in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) is complicated is
that they construct a family of type 1 games ω[A], one for each recursive set A, while
requiring additional conditions that would later become useful for constructing other types
of games. In this appendix, we construct just one type 1 game, forgetting about the
additional conditions. Some aspects of the construction thus become more transparent in
this construction. The construction extends the one (not requiring the game to be of a
particular type) in Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Section 6.2).
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Notation. Let α and β be strings (of 0’s and 1’s).
Then αc denotes the string of the length |α| such that αc(i) = 1 − α(i)
for each i < |α|; for example, 0110100100c = 1001011011. Occasionally, a
string α is identified with the set {i : α(i) = 1}. (Note however that αc is
occasionally identified with the set {i : α(i) = 0}, but never with the set
{i : α(i) = 1}c.)
αβ (or α ∗ β) denotes the concatenation of α followed by β.
α ⊆ β means that α is an initial segment of β (β extends α); α ⊆ A
means that α is an initial segment of a set A.
Strings α and β are incompatible if neither α ⊆ β nor β ⊆ α (i.e.,
there is k < min{|α|, |β|} such that α(k) 6= β(k)). ‖
Let {ks}
∞
s=0 be an effective listing (recursive enumeration) of the mem-
bers of the recursively enumerable set {k : ϕk(k) ∈ {0, 1}}, where ϕk(·)
is the kth partial recursive function of one variable (it is computed by the
Turing program with code (Go¨del) number k). We can assume that k0 ≥ 2
and all the elements ks are distinct. Thus,
CRec ⊂ {k : ϕk(k) ∈ {0, 1}} = {k0, k1, k2, . . .},
where CRec is the set of characteristic indices for recursive sets.
Let l0 = k0 + 1, and for s > 0, let ls = max{ls−1, ks + 1}. We have
ls ≥ ls−1 (that is, {ls} is an nondecreasing sequence of numbers) and ls > ks
for each s. Note also that ls ≥ ls−1 > ks−1, ls ≥ ls−2 > ks−2, etc. imply that
ls > ks, ks−1, ks−2, . . . , k0.
For each s, let Fs be the finite set of strings α = α(0)α(1) · · · α(ls − 1)
of length ls ≥ 3 such that
α(ks) = ϕks(ks) and for each s
′ < s, α(ks′) = 1− ϕk
s′
(ks′). (1)
Note that (1) imposes no constraints on α(k) for k /∈ {k0, k1, k2, . . . , ks},
while it actually imposes constraints for all k in the set, since |α| = ls > ks,
ks−1, ks−2, . . . , k0. We observe that if α ∈ Fs ∩ Fs′ , then s = s
′. Let
F =
⋃
s Fs.
Lemma 21 Any two distinct elements α and β in F are incompatible.
That is, we have neither α ⊆ β (α is an initial segment of β) nor β ⊆ α
(i.e., there is k < min{|α|, |β|} such that α(k) 6= β(k)).
Proof. Let |α| ≤ |β|, without loss of generality. If α and β have the same
length, then the conclusion follows since otherwise they become identical
strings. If ls = |α| < |β| = ls′ , then s < s
′ and by (1), α(ks) = ϕks(ks) on the
one hand, but β(ks) = 1−ϕks(ks) on the other hand. So α(ks) 6= β(ks).
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The game ω will be constructed from the sets T0 and T1 of strings defined
as follows (10 = 1 ∗ 0, 00 = 0 ∗ 0, and 11 = 1 ∗ 1 below):
α ∈ T 00 ⇐⇒ ∃s [α ∈ Fs, α ⊇ 10, and α(ks)(= ϕks(ks)) = 0]
α ∈ T 01 ⇐⇒ ∃s [α ∈ Fs, α ⊇ 10, and α(ks)(= ϕks(ks)) = 1]
α ∈ T0 ⇐⇒ [α ∈ T
0
0 or α
c ∈ T 01 or α = 00]
α ∈ T1 ⇐⇒ [α ∈ T
0
1 or α
c ∈ T 00 or α = 11].
We observe that the sets T 00 , T
0
1 , T0, T1 consist of strings whose lengths are
at least 2, T 00 ⊂ T0, T
0
1 ⊂ T1, T0 ∩ T1 = ∅, and α ∈ T0 ⇔ α
c ∈ T1.
Define ω by S ∈ ω if and only if S has an initial segment in T1. Lem-
mas 22 and 25 establish computability of ω (as well as the assertion that T0
consists of losing determining strings and T1 consists of winning determining
strings) by way of Proposition 3.
Lemma 22 T0 and T1 are recursive.
Proof. We give an algorithm that can decide for each given string σ with
a length of at least 2 whether it is in T0 or in T1 or neither.
If σ ⊇ 00, then σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1 unless σ = 00 ∈ T0.
If σ ⊇ 11, then σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1 unless σ = 11 ∈ T1.
Suppose σ ⊇ 10. In this case, σ ∈ T0 ∪ T1 iff σ ∈ T
0
0 ∪ T
0
1 . Generate
k0, k1, k2, . . . , compute l0, l1, l2, . . . , and determine F0, F1, F2, . . . until we
find the least s such that ls ≥ |σ|.
If ls > |σ|, then σ /∈ Fs. Since ls is nondecreasing in s and Fs consists
of strings of length ls, it follows that σ /∈ F , implying σ /∈ T
0
0 ∪ T
0
1 , that is,
σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1.
If ls = |σ|, then check whether σ ∈ Fs; this can be done since the values
of ϕk
s′
(ks′) for s
′ ≤ s in (1) are available and Fs determined by time s. If
σ /∈ Fs and ls+1 > ls, then σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1 as before. Otherwise check whether
σ ∈ Fs+1. If σ /∈ Fs+1 and ls+2 > ls+1 = ls, then σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1 as before.
Repeating this process, we either get σ ∈ Fs′ for some s
′ or σ /∈ Fs′ for all
s′ ∈ {s′ : ls′ = ls}. In the latter case, we have σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1. In the former
case, if σ(ks′) = ϕk
s′
(ks′) = 1, then σ ∈ T
0
1 ⊂ T1 by the definitions of T
0
1
and T1. Otherwise σ(ks′) = ϕk
s′
(ks′) = 0, and we have σ ∈ T
0
0 ⊂ T0.
Suppose σ ⊇ 01. Then σc ⊇ 10. In this case the algorithm can decide
whether σc is in T 00 or in T
0
1 or neither. If σ
c ∈ T 00 , then σ ∈ T1. If σ
c ∈ T 01 ,
then σ ∈ T0. If σ
c /∈ T 00 ∪ T
0
1 , then σ /∈ T0 ∪ T1.
Lemma 23 Let α, β be distinct strings in T0∪T1. Then α and β are incom-
patible. In particular, if α ∈ T0 and β ∈ T1, then α and β are incompatible.
Proof. Suppose α and β are compatible. Then there is a coalition S
extending α and β.
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If α ⊇ 00, then β ⊇ 00. But there is only one string in T0 ∪ T1 that
extends 00; namely, 00. So α = β = 00, contrary to the assumption that
they are distinct. The case where α ⊇ 11 is similar.
If α ⊇ 10, then β ⊇ 10. So we have α, β ∈ T 00 ∪ T
0
1 , which implies that
α, β ∈ F . By Lemma 21, S cannot extend both α and β, a contradiction.
If α ⊇ 01, then β ⊇ 01. So we have αc, βc ∈ T 01 ∪ T
0
1 , which implies
that αc, βc ∈ F . By Lemma 21, Sc cannot extend both αc and βc, a
contradiction.
Lemma 24 Let α ⊇ 10 be a string of length ls such that α(ks) = ϕks(ks).
Then for some t ≤ s, there is a string β ∈ Ft such that 10 ⊆ β ⊆ α.
Proof. We proceed by induction on s. If s = 0, we have β = α ∈ F0
(note that (1) imposes no constraints on α(0) and α(1)); hence the lemma
holds for s = 0. Suppose the lemma holds for s′ < s. If for some s′ < s,
α(ks′) = ϕk
s′
(ks′), then by the induction hypothesis, for some t ≤ s
′, the
ls′-initial segment α[ls′ ] of α extends a string β ∈ Ft. Hence the conclusion
holds for s. Otherwise, we have for each s′ < s, α(ks′) = 1−ϕk
s′
(ks′). Then
by (1), α ∈ Fs. Letting β = α gives the conclusion.
Lemma 25 Any coalition S ∈ REC has an initial segment in T0 or in T1,
but not both.
Proof. We show that S has an initial segment in T0 ∪ T1. Lemma 23
implies that S does not have initial segments in both T0 and T1. (The
assertion following “In particular” in Lemma 23 is sufficient for this, but
we can actually show the stronger statement that S has exactly one initial
segment in T0 ∪ T1.)
The conclusion is obvious if S ⊇ 00 or S ⊇ 11.
If S ⊇ 10, suppose ϕk is the characteristic function for S. Then k ∈
{k0, k1, k2, . . .} since this set contains the set CRec of characteristic indices.
So k = ks for some s. Consider the initial segment S[ls] := S∩ ls = ϕks [ls] ⊇
10. By Lemma 24, for some t ≤ s, there is a string β ∈ Ft such that
10 ⊆ β ⊆ S[ls]. The conclusion follows since β is an initial segment of S and
β ∈ T 00 ∪ T
0
1 ⊂ T0 ∪ T1.
If S ⊇ 01, then Sc ⊇ 10 has an initial segment β ∈ T 00 ∪ T
0
1 by the
argument above. So, S has the initial segment βc ∈ T1 ∪ T0.
Next, we show that the game ω has the desired properties. Before show-
ing monotonicity, we need the following lemma. For strings α and β with
|α| ≤ |β|, we say β properly contains α if for each k < |α|, α(k) ≤ β(k) and
for some k′ < |α|, α(k′) < β(k′); we say β is properly contained by α if for
each k < |α|, β(k) ≤ α(k) and for some k′ < |α|, β(k′) < α(k′).
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Lemma 26 Let α and β be strings such that |α| ≤ |β|. (i) If α ∈ T1 and β
properly contains α, then β extends a string in T1. (ii) If α ∈ T0 and β is
properly contained by α, then β extends a string in T0.
Proof. (i) Suppose α ∈ T1 and β properly contains α. We have α = 11
or α ∈ T 01 or α
c ∈ T 00 .
If α = 11, no β properly contains α.
Suppose α ∈ T 01 . Then α ∈ Fs for some s. Since β properly contains α ⊇
10, we have β ⊇ 11 or β ⊇ 10. If β ⊇ 11, the conclusion follows since 11 ∈ T1.
Otherwise, β ⊇ 10; choose the least s′ ≤ s such that β(ks′) = ϕk
s′
(ks′) = 1.
(Such an s′ exists since α ∈ T 01 implies α(ks) = ϕks(ks) = 1. Note that
ks′ < ls′ ≤ ls = |α|.) Then for each t < s
′, we have β(kt) = 1 − ϕkt(kt).
(Details. By the choice of s′, for each t < s′, either (a) β(kt) = ϕkt(kt) = 0
or (b) β(kt) 6= ϕt(kt). Suppose (a) for some t < s
′. Since α ∈ Fs, we have
for each t < s, α(kt) = 1 − ϕkt(kt) by (1). Then we have β(kt) = 0 and
α(kt) = 1, contradicting the assumption that β properly contains α.) The
conclusion follows since the initial segment β[ls′ ] is in T
0
1 .
Suppose αc ∈ T 00 . Then α
c ∈ Fs for some s. Since β
c is properly
contained in αc ⊇ 10, we have βc ⊇ 00 or βc ⊇ 10. If βc ⊇ 00, the
conclusion follows since β ⊇ 11 ∈ T1. Otherwise, β
c ⊇ 10; Choose the least
s′ ≤ s such that βc(ks′) = ϕk
s′
(ks′) = 0. Then for each t < s
′, we have
βc(kt) = 1−ϕkt(kt) as before. Therefore, the initial segment β
c[ls′ ] is in T
0
0 .
The conclusion follows since β[ls′ ] ∈ T1.
(ii) Suppose α ∈ T0 and β is properly contained by α. Then α
c ∈ T1 and
βc properly contains αc. Assertion (i) then implies that βc extends a string
βc[ls′ ] in T1. Therefore, β extends the string β[ls′ ] in T0.
Claim 27 The game ω is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose A ∈ ω and B ⊇ A. By the definition of ω, A has an
initial segment α in T1. If B extends α, then clearly B ∈ ω. Otherwise the
|α|-initial segment β = B[|α|] of B properly contains α. By Lemma 26, β
extends a string in T1. Hence B has an initial segment in T1, implying that
B ∈ ω.
Claim 28 The game ω is proper and strong.
Proof. It suffices to show that Sc ∈ ω ⇔ S /∈ ω. From the observations
that T0 and T1 consist of determining strings and that α
c ∈ T0 ⇔ α ∈ T1,
we have
Sc ∈ ω ⇐⇒ Sc has an initial segment in T1
⇐⇒ S has an initial segment in T0
⇐⇒ S /∈ ω.
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Claim 29 The game ω is nonweak and does not have a finite carrier.
Proof. To show that the game does not have a finite carrier, we will
construct a set A such that for infinitely many l, the l-initial segment A[l]
has an extension (as a string) that is winning and for infinitely many l′, A[l′]
has an extension that is losing. This implies that A[l] is not a carrier of ω
for any such l. So no subset of A[l] is a carrier. Since there are arbitrarily
large such l, this proves that ω has no finite carrier.
Let A ⊇ 10 be a set such that for each kt, A(kt) = 1 − ϕkt(kt). For any
s′ > 0 and i ∈ {0, 1}, there is an s > s′ such that ks > ls′ and ϕks(ks) = i.
For a temporarily chosen s′, fix i and fix such s. Then choose the greatest
s′ satisfying these conditions. Since ls > ks > ls′ , there is a string α of
length ls extending A[ls′ ] such that α ∈ Fs. Since α ⊇ 10 and α(ks) =
ϕks(ks) = i, we have α ∈ T
0
i .
There are infinitely many such s, so there are infinitely many such s′. It
follows that for infinitely many ls′ , the initial segment A[ls′ ] is a substring
of some string α in T1, and for infinitely many ls′ , A[ls′ ] is a substring of
some (losing) string α in T0.
To show nonweakness, we give three (winning) coalitions in T1 whose
intersection is empty. First, 10 (in fact any initial segment of the coalition
A ⊇ 10) has extensions α in T1 and β in T0 by the argument above. So 01
has the extension βc in T1. Clearly, the intersection of the winning coalitions
11 ∈ T1, α ⊇ 10, and β
c ⊇ 01 is empty.
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B Type 9 and Type 13 Games
In this attachment, we modify the examples of a type 9 game and a type 13
game in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) so that an empty coalition is losing.
To do that, modify the infinite, computable, type 1 game ω[A] in that paper
as follows ((2.i) and (3) refer to certain requirements in that paper):
9. An infinite, computable, type 9 (nonmonotonic proper strong non-
weak) game. In the construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ 6= 10 that is a proper substring of α, if s = 0
or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1 and α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
furthermore, enumerate 1011 and 1000 in T0.
By (3) of the construction of ω[A], 0100, 0111 ∈ T1. (In other words,
the game is constructed from the sets T0 := T
′
0 ∪ {1011} \ {0100} and
T1 := T
′
1 ∪ {0100} \ {1011}, where T
′
0 and T
′
1 are T0 and T1 in the
original construction of ω[A] renamed. Note that 1011 ∈ T ′1, 1000 ∈
T ′0, 0100 ∈ T
′
0, and 0111 ∈ T
′
1.) Letting α
′ = ∅ in (2*.i), we have
00 ∈ T0; so ∅ is losing. Since either α
′ = 1010 or 1001 is a p-string
satisfying the condition in (2*.i), either 101011 ∈ T1 or 100111 ∈ T1.
Then by (3), either 010100 ∈ T0 or 011000 ∈ T0. So the game is
nonmonotonic, since 0100 is winning. It is also nonweak since 0100 is
winning and either 101011 or 100111 is winning. For the remaining
properties, the proofs are similar to the proofs for ω[A].
13. An infinite, computable, type 13 (nonmonotonic nonproper strong
nonweak) game. In the construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) and (3)
by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ 6= 10 that is a proper substring of α, if s = 0
or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1 and α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
furthermore, enumerate 1011 and 0100 in T1 and 1000 in T0;
(3*) if a string β /∈ {1011, 0100} is enumerated in T1 (or in T0) above,
then enumerate βc in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
By (3*), 0111 ∈ T1. (In other words, the game is constructed from the
sets T0 := T
′
0 \ {0100} and T1 := T
′
1 ∪ {0100}, where T
′
0 and T
′
1 are T0
and T1 in the original construction of ω[A] renamed.)
By an argument similar to that for type 9, ∅ is losing and the game
is nonmonotonic (either 010100 ∈ T0 or 011000 ∈ T0, while 0100 is
winning). It is nonproper since the 0100 and 1011 are winning de-
termining. It is strong since its subset ω[A] is strong. It is nonweak
by Lemma 1 since it is nonproper. The proofs of computability and
nonexistence of a finite carrier are similar to the proofs for ω[A].
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